Aleksandrova observed during the 1930s, examining the semantic fluctuation of Soviet interwar sloganeering and the "downgrading of the socialist elements within it." Such an investigation can illustrate how the celebration of Marxist thematics and Soviet patriotism during the early-to-mid 1930s ultimately contributed to the ascendancy of a more russocentric, etatist ideological line late in the decade.
Aleksandrova had good reason to write that the transformation underway in 1937 was essentially an "ideological metamorphosis.'''' After all, a shift to ethnic particularism in the 1930s -especially Russian ethnic particularismwould seem utterly incompatible with the party ideology of the 1920s. Over the course of the first fifteen years of Soviet power, M. N. Pokrovskii and other early Soviet historian-ideologists had all tended to vilify russocentrism, painting pre-revolutionary Russian history in exclusively dark colors as the story of a chauvinistic, colonizing nation carrying out the will of an oppressive tsarist s y~t e m .~ They proposed as an alternative a propaganda line based on Marxist-Leninism which foregrounded the study of historical materialism, social forces, class antagonism and economic development on an international scale. As if in reference to the line from the Communist Manifesto that "the workers do not have a fatherland,"6 ideological tracts during the 1920s repeatedly emphasisized the primacy of class analysis. Even after the inauguration of the "Socialism in One Country" thesis in the mid-1920s, Soviet propagandists continued to stress class as a more fundamental and decisive social category than other paradigms drawn along ethnic or national lines. A well-known NEP-era legal commentator epitomized this approach in 1927, declaring: "in our times, patriotism's role is that of an extremely reactionary ideology, the task of which is to justify imperialist bestiality and deaden the proletariat's class consciousness." Summarizing well the prevailing view in the press, the article continued that although it was reasonable for workers to show loyalty to societies organized in their interest, such an emotion had little to do with "national7' or "ethnic" affinities. It was, rather, internationalist, proletarian solidarity being at the heart of the emotion and not national borders or blood? As a result of such thinking, the class-based Soviet allegiance system during the 1920s did not attempt to rally all segments of society together; indeed, non-labouring elements and other tsarist hold-overs were generally considered incapable of loyalty to the workers' state and were even forbidden to bear arms in defense of the USSR.~ A left-leaning American observer commented at the time that the emerging society was "not handicapped by patriotism" -comparing such beliefs to religiosity, he observed that they were "sentimental idealisms to the materialist ~olsheviks."~ But less than five years later, Stalin was starting to call such militancy into question. Acknowledging at a major conference in 193 1 that Marx and Engels had been right that "in the past we didn't have and could not have had a fatherland," he cautioned against taking such a line of reasoning too far. After all, "now, since we've overthrown capitalism and power belongs to the worlung class, we have a fatherland and will defend its independence."I0 What was responsible for this about-face? Apparently, the party hierarchy had become frustrated with the previous decade's ineffective ideological line (particularly its materialist and anti-patriotic aspects)." Realizing that such concepts were too arcane and abstract to inspire the USSR's poorly educated population, Stalin and his colleagues began to look for a more pragmatic, populist alternative which would focus on the rather iconoclastic idea of a "socialist fatherland" (to use Aleksandrova's expression). By the mid-1930s, Pravda was promoting precisely such a view without reservation: "Soviet patriotism is a burning feeling of boundless love, a selfless devotion to one's motherland and a profound responsibility for her fate and defense, which issues forth like mighty spring waters from the depths of our people." New sloganeering attempted to rally to the proletarian cause people from outside the industrial working class, ranging from peasants like A. S. Molokova to scholars like Academician A. Bogomolets and the Arctic explorer 0. Iu. Shmidt.I2 In other words, the 1920s' orthodox view of class-based internationalist loyalty had been supplanted by a new notion of patriotic loyalty revolving around the interchangeable concepts of "motherland" and "fatherland,'' a propaganda line which aspired to unite all segments of the society together for the first time since 1917. G. Vasil'kovskii elaborated on this shift in a prominent article in Pravda in May 1934. Echoing Stalin's 1931 commentary, he argued that although Marx and Engels had been correct in 1848 that "the workers do not have a fatherland," the October 1917 revolution had changed things dramatically by producing a workers' state in the midst of a capitalist encirclement.I3 In such a situation, patriotic loyalty to the fatherland was not only possible, but desirable. Moreover, official coverage of the issue in the press indicated that social origin and class were no longer to limit one's ability to be a Soviet loyalist: not only could people from outside the ranks of the industrial proletariat like peasants and scholars now genuinely support Soviet power, but even members of the old nobility like Count Aleksei Tolstoi could be welcomed to the cause.I4 The decisive role of class consciousness in Soviet ideology had given way to a new sense of allegiance based on membership within Soviet society. The entire notion of "Soviet patriotism" would be given a f i r m theoretical basis by K. B. Radek in 1936,15 marking the maturation of a major press campaign which expanded the notion of "Soviet" from a partyoriented affinity based on class to a broader understanding which would henceforth encompass geographic and cultural semantics as we11. 16 Populism complemented this departure from class as the sole organizational principle of Soviet society. Such an initiative was launched as early as 193 1 by people concerned with propaganda and societal mobilization like A. M. Gor'kii, who contended that heroes could be used to popularize the nascent patriotic line "by example." A marked contrast to the 1920s' focus on anonymous social forces and class struggle, this led to the prioritizing of what was essentially a new genre of agitational literature. Prominent multi-volumed series like Gor'kii's History of Plants and Factories and The History of the Civil War in the USSR began to assemble a new pantheon of Soviet heroes, socialist myths and modern-day fables. This "search for a usable past"17 not only focused on shock workers in industry and agriculture, but also lavished attention on prominent Old Bolshevik revolutionaries, industrial planners, party leaders, komsorn~l'~ officials, comintern activists, Red Army heroes, non-Russians from the republican party organizations and even famous members of the secret police.19 Such populist, heroic tales from the recent past were seen as providing a common narrative that the entire society would be able to relate to -a rallying-call with greater social application than the previous decade's narrow and impersonal focus on class and materialism.
Reflecting emergent trends in Socialist Realism20 as well as Stalin's belief in the traditionalist notion of "the great men of hi~tory,"~' this stress on heroism took center stage at the first conference of the Soviet Writers' Union in 1 9 3 4 .~~ In the wake of this conference, a massive array of literature was commissioned to develop and expand upon the new Soviet Olympus and its pantheon of contemporary heroes. Films like Counterplan, Chapaev, The Happy Fellows, Circus, The Frontier, Flyers, The Courageous Seven, Miners and Volga-Volga complemented the campaign with celluloid agitation. Epitomizing this type of propaganda is one of the final scenes in G. V. Aleksandrov's film The Radiant Path, a late example of this genre. Mounting a podium at an industrial exhibition, the heroine, an illiterate maid-turnedengineer and Supreme Soviet Deputy, leads her audience in a rousing verse from the film's theme song "The March of the Enthusiasts":
In these days of great construction sites In the merry din, the ringing and the lights, I send my greetings to this country of heroes To this country of scientists, to this country of dreamers!23
Both populist and pragmatic, such films aimed to inspire "by example," mobilizing Soviet citizens of different social origins, professional occupations and ethnicities under the common banner of Soviet patriotic heroism.
But it would be incorrect to think that film was the chief vehicle for this propaganda, as much of the content for the new campaign was supplied by a torrential wave of books and artwork rolling off the presses. Party history texts and glossy picture albums appearing in massive print-runs detailed heroism on the factory floor as well as in construction projects, the non-Russian republics and even such exotic fields as aeronautics and polar e~p l o r a t i o n .~~ Heroic Old Bolsheviks (e.g. A. S. Enukidze, Ia. E. Rudzutak), as well as prominent figures from the ranks of industry (Iu. L. Piatakov), the party (A. I. Rykov), the komsomol (A. V Kosarev), the comintern (0. A. Piatnitskii), the Red Army (A. I. Egorov), the republican parties (F. Khodzhaev) and the NKVD (Ia. Peters, N. I. Ezhov), received tremendous acclaim and seemed destined to grace the pages of official propaganda tracts for many years to come. As noted above, such books, posters and films were designed to elaborate upon the Soviet "usable past," complementing Socialist Realism's fictional heroes with famous and recognizable personalities from the first fifteen years of Soviet power.
But although this Soviet patriotic populism was expected to supply a unifying narrative that would provide for an upswell of social support for the regime, the campaign faltered within only a few years of its inception. The Great Terror, which tore gaping holes in the fabric of the party hierarchy, the bureaucracy, the military high command, and the intelligentsia between 1936 specialists and construction leadership -that is, precisely those people who were supposed to "populate" the fundamental book on the history of the metro This same phenomenon would be repeated with histories of the party, the Red Army and the komsomol, as successive waves of purging stripped bare the emerging pantheon of heroes and depopulated the narratives under construction. Similar fates befell projects focusing on industrial zones like Magnitogorsk and Moscow's Stalin auto plant.26 The infamous 1934 book on the construction of the Belomor Canal had to be hastily withdrawn from circulation late in 1937 when its editorial board and many of its principle characters were arre~ted.~' Dovetailing with the Belomor Canal book was the 1934 Russian-language edition of Uzbekistan at 10 Years. A glossy photo album designed by the famous graphic artist A. M. Rodchenko, it required extensive airbrushing before appearing in Uzbek during the following year when the fall of Avel' Enukidze necessitated his removal from group portraits printed in the volume.28 Even in revised form, however, Uzbekistan at 10 Years did not remain in circulation for long due to the widening maw of the party purges. Rodchenko's own copy of the book reveals preparations for a third edition in a particularly gruesome manner: blacked out in India ink are the pictures of prominent party and state hnctionaries like Ia. E. Rudzutak and Ia.
Peters, as well as luminaries from the Uzbek party organization like F. Khodzhaev, all of whom "disappeared" between 1936 and 1938.29
While the sagas surrounding the Belomor and Uzbek books are instructive, perhaps nothing was as dramatic as the fiasco surrounding the first volume of the celebrated History of the Civil War in the USSR series. A narrative focusing on the prelude to the revolutionary events of October 19 17, this enormous tome required reissuing in 1938 after the pages of its first edition were found to be littered with the names of Old Bolsheviks who had vanished during the on-going purges. Brief consideration of the volume's contents graphically illustrates how the Great Terror compromised the propaganda value of such texts. Of the sixty-eight individuals who are mentioned in a positive light on the pages of the 1935 edition, fifty-eight were given treatment broad enough to be considered truly "heroic." During the first stages of the party purges in 1936, nearly half of the members of this pantheon were arrested, requiring the volume to be withdrawn from circulation. When the second edition appeared in 1938, it had been stripped of numerous pictures, illustrations and some 27 pages of text, not to mention all passing references to fallen heroes like Piatakov, Rykov and ~i a t n i t s k i i .~~
The next volume in the series -a 600-page book concerning the single month of October 191 7 -did not appear until 1943, the five-year delay apparently stemming from the difficulty involved in drafting a detailed narrative about the revolution without mentioning dozens of individuals now considered enemies of the p e~p l e .~' The third volume in the series would not appear until 1957. But the purges' fall-out was not limited to commemorative albums and picture books. A. P. Dovzhenko's film Shchors, a civil war epic about a Ukrainian revolutionary commissioned in 1935, had to be reshot after Shchors' right-hand man fell victim to the purges and had to be removed from the ~creenplay.~~ Prominent mention of fallen Red Army heroes like A. I. Egorov required excision from public school history texts between 1937 and 1941 .33 The release of the seminal Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was repeatedly postponed as the purges' bloodletting necessitated the removal of numerous names -not only from the narrative, but from the book's editorial board as well. Finally released in the fall of 1938, the Short Course required additional revisions two years later in order to eliminate all mention of N. I. Ezhov, who had been arrested and shot during the intervening period.34 Rurnors of further purges even endangered the small library of publications revolving around 0. Iu. Shmidt, the Cheliuskintsy and other hero-explorers of the far north.35 Uncertainty on the ground level over what to read (and what to teach) panicked officials and propagandists alike, bringing political agitation efforts in the society to a ~t a n d s t i l l .~~ Propaganda revolving around Soviet patriotism was virtually hamstrung by the events of 1936-1938 due to the fact that this campaign had been predicated on the ability to propagandize heroes from the recent past. Unable to even publish a tenable biography of Stalin for much of the 1930s due to the purges' effect on the General Secretary's entourage,37 the rallying of popular support for the regime "by example" became almost prohibitively difficult. This state of affairs ultimately forced the party hierarchy to resume its now increasingly frantic "search for a usable past" according to an entirely different strategy.
On the eve of the meltdown of the Soviet pantheon of heroes, another campaign -"the Friendship of the Peoples" -was maturing under the same patriotic rubric. Designed to aid in the mobilization of the diverse Soviet nations, it had been inaugurated by Stalin in December 1 9 3 5~~ and revolved around the interethnic cooperation and racial harmony purportedly made possible by socialism.39 That being said, it also contained another dimension that had first surfaced (interestingly enough) in the 1934 article by Vasil'kovskii referred to above: the valorization of the Russian proletariat "who gave the world the October revolution." Taboo since 19 17, this Russian ethnic particularism was supported by references to a then little-known fragment of Leniniana entitled "On the National Pride of the Great ~u s s i a n s . '~~ An integral, if not officially-acknowledged element of the "Friendship of the Peoples" campaign, this russocentric undercurrent resurfaced again in a Pravda editorial in early 1936:
All the peoples -participants in the great socialist construction -may be proud of the results of their labour; every one of them -from the smallest to the largest -are Soviet patriots enjoying a full array of rights. First among these equals is the Russian people, the Russian workers and the Russian toilers, whose role throughout the whole Great Proletarian Revolution, from the first victories to the present day's brilliant period of development, is exceptionally large.
Why was this russocentrism such a central component of the "Friendship of the Peoples" sloganeering? Apparently, the purges' paralysis of campaigns revolving around individual Soviet heroes had left few alternatives to the rehabilitation of an ethnically-organized "usable past." Stalin's praise of the dexterous "revolutionary Russian sweep-of-the-hand," repeated several times in the text of the editorial, was not accidentally juxtaposed against the underdevelopment of the non-Russian Soviet peoples. In the wake of this article, the parenthetical expression "first among equals" would be used with increasing frequency in reference to the Russian people's place in Soviet society:' foreshadowing the later emergence of an explicit ethnic hierarchy.
Although the press initially limited its Russian ethnic particularism to contributions during the revolution, with time, Civil War victories42 and the But why such an about face from proletarian internationalism to nationalism? What can explain such heresy? As alluded to above, a pragmatic and urgent need for mobilization predicated this sea-change in party ideology. By the early 1930s, the propaganda of the previous decade was increasingly seen as being excessively abstract, inaccessibly arcane and insufficiently populist. Importantly, the new campaigns surrounding Soviet-era heroes were quickly complemented by the revival of historical personalities from the national past. Instructive is one of the first major challenges to the historical materialist line of the 1920s which occurred during a Politburo discussion of public school history textbooks in March 1934. Objecting to the presentations of several distinguished Bolshevik pedagogues, Stalin launched into a vicious critique of their advocacy of textbooks that privileged materialism and class analysis over a more traditional historical narrative.49 A leading ideologist present at the meeting paraphrased Stalin's remarks several days later: Stalin's commentary was understood by insiders as a call for the revival of conventional state-and personality-based narratives in historically-oriented propaganda. A. S. Bubnov, the Commissar of Education, followed up on Stalin's prescriptions at a historians' conference later that month. Focusing on the excessively schematic (or "sociological") approach to history reflected in the historiography of the 1920s, Bubnov complained that theory was dominating the discussion of history in the schools, leaving events, personalities, and their interconnection to play only a secondary role. As a result, he noted, "an entire array of the most important historical figures, events, wars, etc. slips past [our students] unnoticed.. .. Under such conditions, we have a very large over-encumbrance of what can be referred to as the sociological component, and a major lack, even a complete absence in some places, of what can be referred to as pragmatic hi~tory."~' Such calls for "pragmatic history" (or "a usable past") echoed throughout such forums during the mid-1930s. Synchronized with the above-mentioned explosion of patriotic rhetoric in the press, "pragmatic history" was to catch people's imaginations and promote a unified sense of identity that the previous decade's materialism had failed to stimulate.
Aside from the changes in tone and content, however, we see in Stalin's recommendations something else as well: the endorsement of what was essentially an etatist interpretation of the pre-revolutionary history of the USSR. Such redirection of historiographic priorities to highlight statehoodparticularly Russian statehood -is significant, as we see here the outline of an agenda to replace the 1920s' broad "multicultural" materialist focus on the history of classes and peoples with a single, linear, nation-based narrative.52 Such an impression is confirmed by an account of another Politburo discussion from March 1934 in which Bubnov proposed that the official historical line ought to concern not just the linear pre-revolutionary "history of the USSR," but a broader and more inclusive "history of the peoples of Russia."
Interrupting him, Stalin disagreed, implying that such a focus was excessively diffuse. Asserting that a single thousand-year political narrative ought to be at the center of the new curriculum, he noted simplistically that "the Russian people in the past gathered the other peoples together and have begun that sort of gathering again now."53 Although terse, Stalin was visibly rejecting a multicultural history of the region in favor of a historical narrative which would implicitly focus on the Russian people's state-building across time. When the next generation of history textbooks rolled off the presses in 1937, they dovetailed perfectly with this vision of the "usable past,"54 as did some of the biggest films of the day which also valorized pre-revolutionary princes, monarchs and generals, e.g. Peter the First, Alebandr Nevskii, Minin and Pozharskii, Suvorov, etc.55 The same idea also reverberates throughout a toast that Stalin gave at K. E. Voroshilov's dacha after reviewing the Red Square parade commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the revolution in 1937:
I want to say a few words which may not seem too festive. The Russian tsars did much that was bad. They robbed and enslaved the people. They led wars and seized territory in the interests of the landowners. But they did do one good thing -they put together an enormous state
[stretching] out to Kamchatka. We inherited this state. We Bolsheviks were the first to put together and strengthen this state not in the interests of the landowners and capitalists, but for the toilers and for all the great peoples who make up this state.56
Etatist sympathies, then, in conjunction with a strong current of populism and frustration with the purges' paralysis of propaganda revolving around Soviet heroes, led the party hierarchy to conclude that the most effective historical narrative for the diverse Soviet population would be a Russian-centered one stressing old-fashioned values like state-building and national d e f e n~e .~~ Late in the decade, Stalin would even call for adjustments to be made to the official conceptualization of "Soviet patriotism" in order to account for the shift.58 M.
I. Kalinin responded to Stalin's calls to "develop and cultivate" the concept in 1940 with the announcement that "Soviet patriotism" at its core was a sense of pride and loyalty which had united both Russians and the "most conscious elements of the oppressed nationalities'' under the progressive banner of Russian "national culture" since the mid-nineteenth century.59 Such a russocentric vision was the end result of the "ideological metamorphosis" that Aleksandrova had identified in 1937. In the words of another exile writing at about the same time, Soviet patriotism during the second half of the 1930s had become "simply Russian patrioti~rn."~~ It should come as no surprise that some in the Soviet society of the 1930s were horrified by this ideological turn-about. In early 1939, a veteran leftist literary critic named V I. Blium even had the audacity to complain directly to Stalin in a personal letter about how "socialist patriotism sometimes and in some places is starting to display all the characteristics of racial nationalism." But the party hierarchy remained committed to the new line,6' even amplifying it somewhat between 194 1 and 1945. Little else of substance changed until the mid-1950s.
This article has traced the changing semantics of Soviet mobilizational ideology during the 1930s, focusing on the wane of internationalism, the emergence of Soviet patriotism and the remodulation of this concept away from a focus on a Soviet heroic Olympus toward a pantheon of heroes drawn chiefly from the pre-revolutionary Russian historical past. This shift toward russocentrism in interwar Soviet ideology has long been a source of scholarly controversy. Some have linked this phenomenon to nationalist sympathies within the party hierarchy,62 while others have attributed it to eroding prospects for world r e v~l u t i o n ,~~ and the Stalinist elite's revision of Marxist principles.64 Others associate the transformation with increasing threats from the outside domestic e t a t i~m~~ and administrative pragmatism.67 Still others contend that the phenomenon really only matured in the 1940s in connection with the exigencies of the German invasion.68 A few even deny that it occurred at all.69 With A. M. Dubrovskii, I have argued elsewhere that russocentric themes were privileged in Soviet ideology during the late 1930s within the context of the decade's etatist tendencies. The evolution of the official historical line during these years indicates that the era's reliance on the Russian national past, heroes and myths was a nativist move to popularize a single historical narrative on the pre-revolutionary era for the USSR's poorly-educated citizenry. Put another way, a new sense of pragmatism came to the fore in the party hierarchy of the 1930s which concluded that the utopian proletarian internationalism that had typified Soviet ideology during its first fifteen years was inhibiting the mobilization of Soviet society for industrialization and war. Searching for a more populist rallying call, Stalin and his inner circle eventually settled upon russocentric etatism as the most efficient way to promote statebuilding and popular loyalty to the regime. 70 But critical to this story is the thesis advanced in the present article: that much of the primacy of the era's emphasis on russocentrism and prerevolutionary glory ought to be seen as a syndrome of the purges' hamstringing of parallel propaganda campaigns revolving around "Soviet patriotism" and the heroes of the revolution and socialist construction. Because the party hierarchs' interest in the tsarist past was so instrumental, they seem to have expected, ca. 1935, that themes, imagery and other elements drawn from the "pragmatic history" of the pre-revolutionary time period could CO-exist with other more "Soviet" aspects of the official propaganda line. The USSR's Olympus was to be an integrated one, with Peter the Great, Aleksandr Nevskii and A. S. Pushkin joining Chapaev, Dzerzhinskii, Frunze, Shchors, Enukidze, Rykov, Kosarev, Khodzhaev, Egorov and numerous Stakhanovites in a heroic pantheon styled according to the reigning aesthetics of Socialist Realism.
However, as manic purging in the mid-to-late 1930s destabilized industry, the Red Army command, and the party itself, many Soviet members of the party's nascent pantheon of heroes were swept into the deluge as well. Mobilization "by example" was greatly complicated by the sudden arrest or disappearance of celebrated workers, managers, party officials and military commanders, something which in the short term required the reissuing of many canonical propaganda texts and in the long term threatened to compromise the entire pantheon itself. At times, it must have seemed as if only Socialist Realism'sJictional heroes -Pave1 Korchagin, Gleb Chumalov and othersdid not risk arrest. 71 If the new line's emphasis on russocentric themes and leaders from the tsarist past had been initially off-set (or even over-shadowed) by the popularization of Soviet heroes from the civil war era and on-going socialist construction, the purges' destruction of many of these prominent personalities between 1936 and 1938 complicated this genre of propaganda and contributed to a shift toward an increasing emphasis on heroes from the distant past. Attrition within the ranks of the "Soviet patriots" (Enukidze, Rykov, Kosarev, Khodzhaev, Egorov, etc.) left the pantheon composed principally of traditional Russian national heroes (Nevskii, Peter, Pushkin) and a handful of remaining revolutionaries (Lenin, Stalin, Frunze, Dzerzhinskii, Shchors, etc.). Consequently, increased reliance on traditional Russian heroes was virtually inevitable: not only were the Peters and Nevskiis at least as recognizable as the Fmnzes and Shchors', but they were also often more heroic (at least according to traditional aesthetics) and less likely to be compromised by the purges?* In this sense, the faltering of the Soviet patriotism campaign during the Great Terror contributed to the ascendancy of a russocentric vision of the USSR's "usable past" which would prove to be durable and dynamic enough to script Soviet propaganda campaigns over the course of the next twenty years. 19-20 (1937), 73-6; K. Sokolov, "Sovetskie patrioty," ibid. no. 3 (1938) , 13-14; idem, "My -sovetskie patrioty," ibid. no. 14-1 6 (1938), 14-1 6; E. Sitovskii, "0 sovetskom patriotizme," Pod znamenem marksizma no. 9 (1939), 39-57; "Patriot" and "Patriotizm," in Tolkovyi slovar'russkogo iazyka, B. M. Volin and D. N. Ushakov, eds., vol. 3 (Moscow 1939), 68; Vasetskii, "Moral'no- (Iu. Raizman, 1935) , Granitsa (M. Dubson, 1935) , Semero smefykh (S. Gerasimov, 1935) , Shakhtery (Iutkevich, 1937 ), Volga-klga (Aleksandrov, 1938 , and Svetlyi put ' (Aleksandrov, 1940 
